Sunday, July 30, 2006

Ceasefire chances

The day Israel realised that this was a real war

When a bloody ambush in a Lebanese village ripped apart a squad of Israeli troops last week, the full reality of the fighting reached homes in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem for the first time. But calls for a major offensive have reawakened painful memories of old defeats, and old losses, across the troubled border

Ian Black in Jerusalem, Inigo Gilmore in Nahariya and Mitchell Prothero in Beirut

Observer July 30, 2006

It was five in the morning and the lead Golani Brigade squad was moving carefully through the outskirts of Bint Jbeil when a burst of automatic fire rang out. Hizbollah fighters engaged the Israeli patrol at close range with machine-guns and rocket-propelled grenades, from alleys, windows and rooftops. Two men died in the first moments; six more were killed over the coming hours. It was, one survivor said later, an 'ambush from hell'.
Sergeant Evyatar Dahan, shot through the shoulder, managed to kick away a live grenade seconds before it exploded but watched as his company commander was killed. 'It was terrible: the shooting went on and on and there was screaming from all directions,' the young infantryman recalled afterwards. 'We were like sitting ducks,' said another soldier.
After the initial shock, reinforcements arrived and air strikes were called in from across the border - just two kilometres south - to pin down the Lebanese Shia guerrillas. But it was seven hours before the wounded could be evacuated by helicopter, and only then under heavy fire. Hizbollah said its men could hear the Israelis screaming.
The men of C Company fortified a house and guarded their dead, to ensure they were not snatched as part of a macabre strategy of trading prisoners, alive, dead or dismembered. They eventually dragged eight corpses down a steep hillside under cover of darkness. 'We did everything we could to stop them getting to the bodies,' Sergeant Ohad Shalom told reporters, 'because we knew that, for them, that's the big prize. '
Two weeks into the fighting between Israel and Hizbollah, Wednesday's battle - 'the longest day', one newspaper called it - may have marked a bloody turning point. Indeed last night Israel announced it was pulling its ground troops out of Bint Jbeil, saying it had accomplished its objectives there and dealt a heavy blow to the militant group, but admitting it had paid a heavy price with the lives of Israeli soldiers. Heavy indeed, as it was a withdrawal, not a victory. Hizbollah fighters still hold Bint Jbeil.
The strangest war in Israel's history began almost by accident. In the safety of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, out of range of the rockets, it has had an air of bizarre unreality. Now it has become desperately real - a grim swirl of military funerals and interviews with grieving families.
Before Wednesday, Hizbollah rockets had killed 19 civilians, and 24 servicemen had died in earlier fighting, including the eight killed on 12 July, when two soldiers were also abducted in a signature Hizbollah operation. But the ordeal of Golani Battalion 51 has the makings of a myth - like the notoriously costly attack on Syrian positions on the Golan Heights in the 1967 war. Heroic it may have been, but it was painful too: 'like sticking a finger into boiling soup,' one commander complained. And it looks like triggering a more unpredictable war.
Even before Wednesday there was unease in Israel about the conduct of the fighting. Military experts called for larger ground forces, for more and bigger bombing raids on Hizbollah's rocket launchers, especially around Tyre, and for razing villages or hitting strategic targets further north.
But Ehud Olmert, like other Israeli politicians and generals, remembers only too well what happened in 1982, the last time young conscripts died for Bint Jbeil and scores of other Lebanese towns and villages. Twenty-four years on, the ghosts of Ariel Sharon's disastrous 'Peace for Galilee' operation have never been laid. Thus calls for a wider ground offensive were resisted at Thursday's cabinet meeting, where there were angry exchanges between ministers and generals. Still, orders for a large stand-by mobilisation of reserves suggests it will come - and probably sooner rather than later. The army is only using a tiny proportion of its strength, chief of staff Major General Dan Halutz, told the paper Yedioth Ahronoth on Friday.
Caution is certainly called for. Hizbollah spent the six years after Israel's withdrawal in 2000 building bunkers and tunnels and stockpiling rockets supplied from Iran and Syria - itself raising troubling questions about Israel's much-vaunted intelligence services as well as the judgment of the country's political leaders. 'Even if we did know what was going on, the withdrawal from Lebanon was more important that the Hizbollah build-up,' said one Israeli diplomat.
Halutz and other senior officers rebuff suggestions that the Israel Defence Forces have gone soft, lost their fighting edge or falling asleep on the job. 'There is nothing we didn't know,' the chief of staff insisted. 'It's not fair and its not right to attack our intelligence. We knew a lot.'
Hizbollah is said to have mined approach roads from Israel, honing techniques tried with devastating effect on American forces in Iraq. Their fighters, local men, have the advantage of familiarity with difficult terrain. Three regional commands have operational autonomy from Beirut. The IDF has a healthy respect for their weapons - including laser-guided anti-tank missiles capable of penetrating the armour of Israel's Merkava tank.
General Udi Adam, head of Israel's northern command, made a revealing slip of the tongue when he referred in a briefing to Hizbollah 'soldiers', quickly correcting himself to say 'fighters' instead. Israelis who sneer at rag-tag Palestinian 'terrorists' armed with little more than Kalashnikovs compare the Lebanese group to Iranian special forces that have studied their enemy's tactics and battle doctrine. 'This isn't like the war we fight in the territories [the West Bank and Gaza],' said another senior officer. 'This is a real war.'
So a large-scale invasion could play to Hizbollah's advantages. 'They don't want to take on Israel's military might head-on near the border, but to draw them in, extend their supply lines and then start hitting them,' suggested Timur Goksel, a Turk who served with UN peacekeepers in Lebanon for 20 years and watched Hizbollah win its spurs as the 'Islamic resistance' against Israeli occupation.
Israel claims to have killed 200 Hizbollah fighters so far, including several senior commanders. But the group is keeping quiet, aware of the power of misinformation and psychological warfare in a conflict like this. Its operational secrecy is formidable - vital to prevent the penetration by Israeli agents that has proved so fatal to Palestinian groups. 'After almost 20 years covering them, I have exactly one source in the Hizbollah military wing,' complained a Lebanese Shia journalist, 'and he tells me nothing.' Fighters have to meet stringent social, religious and aptitudinal requirements. Recruits often come from the same family or tribe to ensure loyalty.
Still, Israel is clearly far from being completely 'blind'. It reportedly intercepted a message from Hassan Nasrallah, the Hizbollah leader, admitting he was taken aback by the scale of Israel's response. It knows enough to be able to bomb trucks bringing in supplies from Syria and Iran - but worries about exposing intelligence by trumpeting its successes. Some surprisingly detailed information about Hizbollah capabilities has certainly reached Israeli military correspondents. The most alarming concerns the Iranian Zelzal rocket, with a range of 150 to 210 km, capable of reaching Tel Aviv; Nasrallah's ominous threat to hit targets south of Haifa was assumed to be a reference to that.
The Israeli military clearly has its own agenda. But one independent expert believes Hizbollah is in trouble, though still capable of doing serious damage. 'To fire missiles at Israel you don't need a well-oiled chain of command,' said Professor Eyal Zisser of Tel Aviv University. 'One of the advantages of a guerrilla organisation is it doesn't need a complex system of command and control.'
Shocked by its losses, Israel is displaying a new determination to see this through, though nobody can say exactly what that means. 'What's our endgame?' said one senior government official. 'We're working on it now.' But before the end there looks like being a lot more bloodshed - cheered on by the public and media. 'Before any international agreement, Israel must sound the last chord, launching a massive air and ground offensive that will end this mortifying war, not with a whimper but with a thunderous roar,' urged the influential Haaretz columnist Yoel Marcus.
And the soldiers are showing no sign of weakness, boasting that Hizbollah's fighters may be the toast of the Arab world but can still be beaten. 'For us it's like rain,' said Colonel Ofek Bukhris after the men of Battalion 51 were buried. 'We got wet, but they got wetter. We were really smashed up. But they were smashed up worse. It wasn't a failure and it wasn't a black day. It was a fight between us and them. That's war.'

How a solution could be found

Scenario One

The Quick Fix
Aim: earliest possible ceasefire
Time frame: a week to 10 days
What has to happen: Condoleezza Rice, who headed back to the Middle East yesterday, must get the Israeli and Lebanese governments to agree to the terms of a Security Council resolution under which Israel stops firing and pulls out of southern Lebanon while Hizbollah stops firing missiles and is disarmed. In separate talks starting tomorrow, the Americans, British, French and a host of other outside powers must put together an international force with the muscle and mandate to police such a deal and help the Lebanese army move south. An internationally brokered arrangement is made to release the two Israeli soldiers kidnapped by Hizbollah.
What can go wrong: an awful lot. But among the main possible roadblocks, Hizbollah - and its Syrian and Iranian patrons - won't play ball. The Israelis will decide they haven't sufficiently weakened the militia's missile batteries and other installations to stop attacking.

Chances of success: 20 to 30 per cent.

Scenario Two

'Urgent but stable' ceasefire

Aim: reverse the escalation in hopes of a deal as soon as practicable.
Time frame: two to three weeks
What has to happen: Rice must get her resolution, and the bare bones of a proposed international force put in place. But with Hizbollah still determined - and able - to fire missiles into Israel, and the Israelis determined to achieve their minimum war aim of taking out all the missile launchers and command bunkers they can, diplomacy must somehow bring the militia to heel. The most likely mechanism: a mix of Lebanese, Saudi, Egyptian and other Arab pressure on Syria, Iran and Hizbollah.
What can go wrong: Hizbollah will decide time is on its side. Though Syria may be amenable to Arab pressure, the Iranians may prove less so. Deployment of the international force, hopeful of policing a deal rather than fighting to impose one, is delayed.

Chances of success: 50 to 60 per cent.

Scenario Three

The long, hard slog

Aim: To wind down the conflict while minimising civilian casualties, shrinking the battlefield and getting aid sent in.
Time frame: one to two months
What has to happen: all of the above, plus a painstakingly negotiated arrangement under which the Israelis rein in their offensive as it clears Hizbollah launchers and strongholds near the border, the international force gradually takes over as Israel pulls back, and Lebanon moves army units southwards to the border area.
What can go wrong: some of the above, but less likely to block a deal assuming Israel's military attacks in the south have achieved significant success, and Hizbollah has been weakened. Still, the political climate in the Middle East and internationally is likely to have been further poisoned by a prolonged conflict - even this deal may be difficult.

Chances of success: 70 per cent

Scenario Four

A widened regional conflict
The chances: can't be discounted completely, given the turbulence in the Middle East, but probably unlikely since neither of the two main potential combatants - Israel and Syria - wants it.

Wednesday, July 19, 2006

Tunnel vision

Myanmar and North Korea share a tunnel vision

By Bertil Lintner

Asia Times 19 July 2006

BANGKOK - Under perceived threats from the US, Myanmar and North Korea are strengthening their strategic ties in a military-to-military exchange that includes weapons sales, technology transfer and underground tunneling expertise. Myanmar's ruling State Peace and Development Council last year abruptly moved the country's capital to a secluded location near the mountainous town of Pyinmana, 400 kilometers north of Yangon, where the SPDC has built an entirely new city in the jungle. Ordinary citizens do not have the right to enter the new capital, Nay Pyi Daw, which is populated entirely by soldiers and government officials.

During the March 27 Armed Forces Day celebrations held there, civilian diplomats were barred from attending and only foreign defense attaches were invited. North Koreans, however, are allowed unfettered access to the secluded new capital. Last month, Asian intelligence agencies intercepted a message from Nay Pyi Daw confirming the arrival of a group of North Korean tunneling experts at the site. Nay Pyi Daw is in the foothills of Myanmar's eastern mountains, and it has long been suspected by Yangon-based diplomats that the most sensitive military installations in the new capital would be relocated underground.

The SPDC's apparent fear of a preemptive US invasion or being the target of US air strikes was seen as a major motivation behind the junta's decision to move the capital to what they perceive to be a safer mountainous location. The administration of US President George W Bush has publicly lumped Myanmar with what it considers rogue regimes, and US officials have recently referred to Myanmar as an "outpost of tyranny". That perceived threat has drawn Myanmar and North Korea closer together in recent months. One key component of those growing strategic ties is North Korea's expertise in tunneling. Pyongyang is known to have dug extensive tunnels under the demarcation line with South Korea as part of contingency invasion plans.

Most of Pyongyang's own defense industries, including its chemical- and biological-weapons programs, and many other military installations are underground. This includes known factories at Ganggye and Sakchu, where thousands of technicians and workers labor in a maze of tunnels dug into and under mountains. The United States suspects there could be hundreds of underground military-oriented sites scattered across North Korea. Curious connectionMyanmar's curious North Korean connection has been the subject of much strategic speculation ever since it was first disclosed in the Far Eastern Economic Review in 2003.

Preliminary reports were met with skepticism because Myanmar (then known as Burma) had severed diplomatic relations with North Korea in 1983 after three secret agents planted a bomb at Yangon's Martyrs' Mausoleum and killed 18 visiting South Korean officials, including then-deputy prime minister So Suk-chun and three other government ministers. One of the North Korean agents, Kim Chi-o, was killed by Burmese security forces in the ensuing gun battle, while the others, Zin Mo and Kang Min-chul, were captured. Two years later, Zin, a North Korean army major, was hanged at Insein jail on the outskirts of the then-capital Rangoon (Yangon), while Kang was spared because he cooperated with the prosecution. Kang still languishes in Insein, but is reported to be staying in the so-called "Villa Wing" - a small private house with a tiny garden surrounded by high barbed-wire fences.

Reports about renewed ties between the two pariah nations gradually began to emerge - and it seems that Kang, unwittingly, was the reason the relationship was restored. In the early 1990s, secret meetings were held in Bangkok between North Korea's and Myanmar's ambassadors to Thailand. Pyongyang negotiated for Myanmar to extradite Kang, presumably because it wanted to punish him for betraying the "fatherland". But the two sides soon discovered that they actually had much more in common than their unfortunate history. Both authoritarian countries were coming under unprecedented international condemnation, especially by the US. Moreover, Myanmar needed more military hardware to battle ethnic insurgent groups and North Korea was willing to accept barter deals for the armaments, an arrangement that suited the cash-strapped generals in Yangon.

The bilateral relationship has reportedly intensified in recent years as both countries come under heavy US pressure. "They have both drawn their wagons into a circle ready to defend themselves," a Bangkok-based Western diplomat said in reference to Myanmar-North Korean ties, adding that Myanmar's generals "admire the North Koreans for standing up to the United States and wish they could do the same. But they haven't got the same bargaining power as the North Koreans."

Recent regional media reports about North Korea possibly providing nuclear know-how to Myanmar's generals are probably off the mark - at least for now. That said, North Korea has definitely been an important source of military hardware for Myanmar. According to Myanmar expert Andrew Selth, of Australia, the state in late 1998 purchased between 12 and 16 130-millimeter M-46 field guns from North Korea. "While based on a 1950s Russian design, these weapons were battle-tested and reliable," Selth stated in "Myanmar's North Korean Gambit: A Challenge to Regional Security?" - a working paper he published with the Australian National University in 2004. "They significantly increased Myanmar's long-range artillery capabilities, which were then very weak."

Secret visits. According to South Korean intelligence sources, a delegation from Myanmar made a secret visit to Pyongyang in November 2000, where the two sides held talks with high-ranking officials of North Korea's Ministry of the People's Armed Forces. In June 2001, a high-level North Korean delegation led by Vice Foreign Minister Park Kil-yon paid a return visit to Yangon, where it met Myanmar's Deputy Defense Minister Khin Maung Win and reportedly discussed defense-industry cooperation. The two sides reportedly did not discuss the reopening of official ties, still severed since the 1983 bombing incident. The cooperation has instead been kept low-key and purposefully not officially announced. "It's a marriage of convenience," said an Asian diplomat who is tracking the expanding ties. "They share common interests and a common mindset. But [Myanmar] doesn't want to be seen as having forgiven North Korea for the [Yangon] bombing, or to antagonize South Korea, which has become an important trade partner."

North Korea and Myanmar are apparently only pursuing conventional arms sales and technology transfers, rather than high-tech weapons sales such as long-range missiles. To date, the most advanced weaponry that North Korea has delivered, or may be considering delivering, are surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) for Myanmar's naval vessels. Myanmar currently has six Houxin guided-missile patrol boats, which were bought from China in the mid-1990s, according to Selth. Based at Myanmar's main naval facility at Monkey Point in Yangon, each vessel is armed with four C-801 "Eagle Strike" anti-ship cruise missiles. Selth speculates that similar SSMs will be mounted on the three new corvettes that have recently been built at Yangon's Sinmalaik shipyard, or on to the navy's four new Myanmar-class patrol boats, which have likewise recently been built in local shipyards.

In July 2003, between 15 and 20 North Korean technicians were seen by intelligence sources at Monkey Point and later at a secluded Defense Ministry guesthouse in a northern suburb of the then-capital. North Korean technicians have since been spotted near the central Myanmar town of Natmauk - which led to the assumption they were involved in Myanmar's nuclear program because of its proximity to the site where Russia had planned to build a nuclear research reactor starting in 2000. There is no evidence to indicate that Russia ever delivered the reactor, however. Myanmar's cash-strapped generals reportedly could not afford the ticket price, and unlike North Korea, Russia was not willing to accept the barter deal Myanmar had proposed. Nevertheless, several hundred Myanmar residents have gone to Russia for training in nuclear technology over the past five years, a strong suggestion that Myanmar has not entirely abandoned its nuclear ambitions.

The North Koreans now situated in central Myanmar are most likely there to help the SPDC protect its military hardware and other sensitive material from perceived US threats. In 2003, Myanmar's generals built a massive bunker near the central town of Taungdwingyi with North Korean assistance. The recent arrival of North Korean tunneling experts at Nay Pyi Daw lends credence to the suggestion that they are construction engineers with expertise in tunneling rather than nuclear physicists.

Still, the regional strategic implications of a North Korea-Myanmar defense relationship are similar. Rather than making Myanmar more secure and cash-strapped North Korea richer, news of the two sides growing strategic ties will likely lead to further international condemnation of both regimes. Furthermore, Myanmar is a member to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and fellow members such as Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia are not likely to accept passively any sort of North Korean military presence within the geographical bloc. There have recently been calls to expel Myanmar from ASEAN for its abysmal human-rights record and lack of progress toward democracy. By forging an alliance with Pyongyang, according to Selth, Myanmar's generals may in fact be encouraging the very development that it fears the most: active outside intervention in what they consider to be their "internal affairs".

Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review and the author of Great Leader, Dear Leader: Demystifying North Korea under the Kim Clan. He has also written many books on Myanmar politics and culture and is currently a writer with Asia-Pacific Media Services.

Tuesday, July 18, 2006

A summit dialogue

Yo, Blair. How are you doin’?’

Times 18 July 2006

Bush Yo, Blair. How are you doin’?
Blair I’m just . . . Bush You’re leaving?
Blair No, no, no, not yet. On this trade thingy . . .(inaudible)
Bush Yeah, I told that to the man. Thanks for (inaudible) it’s awfully thoughtful of you.
Blair It’s a pleasure.
Bush I know you picked it out yourself.
Blair Absolutely (inaudible).
Bush What about Kofi? (inaudible) His attitude to ceasefire and everything else . . . happens. Blair Yeah, no I think the (inaudible) is really difficult. We can’t stop this unless you get this international business agreed.
Bush Yeah. Blair I don’t know what you guys have talked about, but as I say I am perfectly happy to try and see what the lie of the land is, but you need that done quickly because otherwise it will spiral.
Bush I think Condi is going to go pretty soon.
Blair But that’s, that’s, that’s all that matters. But if you . . . you see it will take some time to get that together.
Bush Yeah, yeah.
Blair But at least it gives people . . .
Bush It’s a process, I agree. I told her your offer to . . .
Blair Well, it’s only if, I mean, you know. If she’s got a, or if she needs the ground prepared, as it were. Because obviously if she goes out, she’s got to succeed, if it were, whereas I can go out and just talk.
Bush You see, the thing is, what they need to do is to get Syria to get Hezbollah to stop doing this shit and it’s over. (inaudible)
Blair Syria.
Bush Why?
Blair Because I think this is all part of the same thing.
Bush Yeah.
Blair What does he think? He thinks if Lebanon turns out fine, if we get a solution in Israel and Palestine, Iraq goes in the right way . . .
Bush Yeah, yeah, he is sweet.
Blair He is honey. And that’s what the whole thing is about. It’s the same with Iraq.
Bush I felt like telling Kofi to call, to get on the phone to Assad and make something happen. Blair Yeah.
Bush We are not blaming the Lebanese Government.
Blair Is this . . .? (he taps the microphone in front of him and the sound is cut.)

Independent’s version:

Bush: Yo, Blair. How are you doing? (Does he regard Mr Blair as an equal? What about 'Yo, Tony'?)
Blair: I'm just...
Bush: You're leaving?
Blair: No, no, no not yet. On this trade thingy....(inaudible) (Mr Blair is getting anxious that the World Trade Organisation is falling apart because some nations, including the US, are putting domestic interests before a worldwide free trade agreement)
Bush: Yeah, I told that to the man.
Blair: Are you planning to say that here or not?
Bush: If you want me to.
Blair: Well, it's just that if the discussion arises...
Bush: I just want some movement.
Blair: Yeah.
Bush: Yesterday we didn't see much movement.
Blair: No, no, it may be that it's not, it may be that it's impossible.
Bush: I am prepared to say it.
Blair: But it's just I think what we need to be an opposition...
Bush: Who is introducing the trade?
Blair: Angela (The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, will lead the trade discussion. That is good for Mr Blair. She is on his side.)
Bush: Tell her to call 'em.
Blair: Yes.
Bush: Tell her to put him on, them on the spot. Thanks for the sweater it's awfully thoughtful of you.
Blair: It's a pleasure.
Bush: I know you picked it out yourself.
Blair: Oh, absolutely, in fact (inaudible)
Bush: What about Kofi? (inaudible) His attitude to ceasefire and everything else ... happens. (Change of subject. Now they are on to Lebanon and the UN secretary general, Kofi Annan)
Blair: Yeah, no I think the (inaudible) is really difficult. We can't stop this unless you get this international business agreed.
Bush: Yeah. (Mr Blair is trying to push the idea of a UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon. That 'yeah' does not sound like a wholehearted agreement)
Blair: I don't know what you guys have talked about, but as I say I am perfectly happy to try and see what the lie of the land is, but you need that done quickly because otherwise it will spiral. (Meaning: 'Please, George, let me go to the Middle East and be a world statesman')
Bush: I think Condi is going to go pretty soon. (Meaning: 'No')
Blair: But that's, that's, that's all that matters. But if you... you see it will take some time to get that together. (Meaning: 'Oh well, all right, if you don't want me to. Just a thought')
Bush: Yeah, yeah.
Blair: But at least it gives people...
Bush: It's a process, I agree. I told her your offer to... (Meaning: 'Drop it. You're not going.')
Blair: Well... it's only if I mean... you know. If she's got a..., or if she needs the ground prepared as it were... Because obviously if she goes out, she's got to succeed, if it were, whereas I can go out and just talk.
Bush: You see, the ... thing is what they need to do is to get Syria, to get Hizbollah to stop doing this shit and it's over. (Mr Bush is expressing his belief that Syria is pulling Hizbollah's strings, while Mr Blair is hinting the Syrians might be up to no good as well)
Blair: (inaudible)
Bush: (inaudible)
Blair: Syria.
Bush: Why?
Blair: Because I think this is all part of the same thing.
Bush: Yeah.
Blair: What does he think? He thinks if Lebanon turns out fine, if we get a solution in Israel and Palestine, Iraq goes in the right way... (Here they might be talking about Kofi Annan, or they may mean the Syrian President, Bashir Assad)
Bush: Yeah, yeah, he is sweet. (Mr Bush is probably being sarcastic)
Blair: He is honey. And that's what the whole thing is about. It's the same with Iraq.
Bush: I felt like telling Kofi to call, to get on the phone to Assad and make something happen.
Blair: Yeah.
Bush: (inaudible)
Blair:(inaudible)
Bush: We are not blaming the Lebanese government.
Blair: Is this...? (at this point Blair taps the microphone in front of him and the sound is cut.)

Saturday, July 08, 2006

Books v sport

The sixth form fights back

William Rees-Mogg

The Times 26 June 2006

As long as ministers prefer Wayne Rooney to Isaac Newton, Britain's literary heritage will never be safe

IN THE SECOND half of the 19th century, English public schools fell under the spell of athletic prestige. Both masters and boys were encouraged to admire the “muddied oafs” of the first XV or the first XI. Correspondingly they tended to look down on the scholars of the sixth form. This anti- intellectualism is well described in the memoirs of those scholars, such as Robert Graves’s brilliant account of pre-1914 Charterhouse, Goodbye To All That.
I feel sure that Graves’s description was accurate; my father was at the school at the same time, and experienced the same exaggerated worship of games players. The effect was to infantilise the school, with senior masters joining in the athletic hero-worship which may be natural for 14-year-olds but is not for grown-ups.
By the time I went to Charterhouse, in the early 1940s, two reforming headmasters, Frank Fletcher and Robert Birley, had counterattacked this cult of games. We enjoyed the successes of our school teams, and Charterhouse had in Peter May one of the greatest batsmen of all time, but there was no tendency to worship even the best players, or to rate success in games above the pursuit of knowledge. The Victorian cult of games was no more than a rather disagreeable memory. That remained the case until the present day.
Modern England seems to have reacquired some of the characteristics of the late Victorian public schools. The Prime Minister, with his breezy manner, has an easy charm when talking to the boys; he is like one of the clerical headmasters of the 1890s. His best speeches resemble little sermons. He exhorts us all to pull up our socks, show house spirit, obey the rules and demonstrate what the Victorians believed to be the Christian virtues of keenness and industry. He admires athletes, but is inclined to think that sixth-form boys should get out of their stuffy libraries and breathe some good fresh air. He encourages his house masters, some of whom are pretty dim, to impose endless petty restrictions.
This has never been a congenial atmosphere for those who do not share late Victorian attitudes. Sooner or later a reaction was bound to follow. Last weekend saw the sixth form answer back. Protest was written by the right person for the right journal.
Nicolas Barker is the hero of bookmen everywhere. He has worked in serious publishing; he has held a senior position at the British Library; he is an expert in the conservation of books; he has written his own excellent books; he has protected and edited The Book Collector for more than a generation; and he is respected as a fine scholar.
His article appeared in Friday’s Times Literary Supplement. The TLS is a radical publication. It has always devoted itself simply to English literature and to maintaining the highest possible standards of literary criticism and scholarship. It is a journal to be wondered at and admired.
Mr Barker was writing about the preservation of the literary heritage. As he observes, “the English language and its literature are all pervasive, and, as our largest and most successful export, might seem to need no defence”. Unfortunately, when it comes to the most important collections which illustrate our literary or scientific heritage, this is far from being the case.
Mr Barker was one of those who approached the complex heritage bureaucracy to help to save two extremely important collections, the Macclesfield Library of Scientific Books, which goes back before Isaac Newton, and the John Murray archive, with its amazing 19th-century collections. Macclesfield is being dispersed; Murray seems almost to have been saved for the National Library of Scotland. In fighting these battles, Mr Barker had to negotiate with the Treasury, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), the Heritage Lottery Fund and Resource (or the Council for Museums, Archives and Libraries, now MLA).
Some of the reasons given for the failure to help were bizarre. In the case of the Macclesfield Library, a unique collection that should have been held together, one problem was Lord Macclesfield’s tax position. It was not that Lord Macclesfield owed too much tax, but that he did not owe any at all. The purchase of collections or works of art or scholarship for the nation is based on the remission of tax. Apparently when there is no tax to remit, there are no funds for purchase. Another excuse was given in 2004 by Lord McIntosh of Haringey, the Minister for the Media and Heritage. He wrote a letter which effectively ended the hopes of saving the Macclesfield Library. He wrote that it was not for Resource to approach private owners “as auction houses would take great exception to this”.
It would be hard to think of a less plausible excuse. No auction house is known to have objected to Resource or the department approaching private owners. On the contrary, auction houses often helped to initiate such negotiations. If they did object, their objections would have no standing.
Mr Barker was, however, told a real truth by one civil servant with whom he negotiated. “When it comes to priorities you have to read DCMS backwards: Sport before Media, Media before Culture.” That is proved by the statistics of funding. “Between 2001 and 2006, the DCMS will have increased funding for sport by 91 per cent, the arts by 63 per cent, and museums, libraries and archives by 26 per cent.” A report by the London School of Economics suggests that museums, libraries and archives have nothing less to do but “prepare for an orderly management of decline”.
But the digital age offers infinitely better access to museums, libraries and archives. Far from being a period of decline, it opens up an unprecedented opportunity. This opportunity will not be taken so long as ministers believe that David Beckham and Wayne Rooney matter far more than John Murray and Isaac Newton.

Books v sport

The sixth form fights back

William Rees-Mogg

The Times 26 June 2006

As long as ministers prefer Wayne Rooney to Isaac Newton, Britain's literary heritage will never be safe

IN THE SECOND half of the 19th century, English public schools fell under the spell of athletic prestige. Both masters and boys were encouraged to admire the “muddied oafs” of the first XV or the first XI. Correspondingly they tended to look down on the scholars of the sixth form. This anti- intellectualism is well described in the memoirs of those scholars, such as Robert Graves’s brilliant account of pre-1914 Charterhouse, Goodbye To All That.
I feel sure that Graves’s description was accurate; my father was at the school at the same time, and experienced the same exaggerated worship of games players. The effect was to infantilise the school, with senior masters joining in the athletic hero-worship which may be natural for 14-year-olds but is not for grown-ups.
By the time I went to Charterhouse, in the early 1940s, two reforming headmasters, Frank Fletcher and Robert Birley, had counterattacked this cult of games. We enjoyed the successes of our school teams, and Charterhouse had in Peter May one of the greatest batsmen of all time, but there was no tendency to worship even the best players, or to rate success in games above the pursuit of knowledge. The Victorian cult of games was no more than a rather disagreeable memory. That remained the case until the present day.
Modern England seems to have reacquired some of the characteristics of the late Victorian public schools. The Prime Minister, with his breezy manner, has an easy charm when talking to the boys; he is like one of the clerical headmasters of the 1890s. His best speeches resemble little sermons. He exhorts us all to pull up our socks, show house spirit, obey the rules and demonstrate what the Victorians believed to be the Christian virtues of keenness and industry. He admires athletes, but is inclined to think that sixth-form boys should get out of their stuffy libraries and breathe some good fresh air. He encourages his house masters, some of whom are pretty dim, to impose endless petty restrictions.
This has never been a congenial atmosphere for those who do not share late Victorian attitudes. Sooner or later a reaction was bound to follow. Last weekend saw the sixth form answer back. Protest was written by the right person for the right journal.
Nicolas Barker is the hero of bookmen everywhere. He has worked in serious publishing; he has held a senior position at the British Library; he is an expert in the conservation of books; he has written his own excellent books; he has protected and edited The Book Collector for more than a generation; and he is respected as a fine scholar.
His article appeared in Friday’s Times Literary Supplement. The TLS is a radical publication. It has always devoted itself simply to English literature and to maintaining the highest possible standards of literary criticism and scholarship. It is a journal to be wondered at and admired.
Mr Barker was writing about the preservation of the literary heritage. As he observes, “the English language and its literature are all pervasive, and, as our largest and most successful export, might seem to need no defence”. Unfortunately, when it comes to the most important collections which illustrate our literary or scientific heritage, this is far from being the case.
Mr Barker was one of those who approached the complex heritage bureaucracy to help to save two extremely important collections, the Macclesfield Library of Scientific Books, which goes back before Isaac Newton, and the John Murray archive, with its amazing 19th-century collections. Macclesfield is being dispersed; Murray seems almost to have been saved for the National Library of Scotland. In fighting these battles, Mr Barker had to negotiate with the Treasury, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), the Heritage Lottery Fund and Resource (or the Council for Museums, Archives and Libraries, now MLA).
Some of the reasons given for the failure to help were bizarre. In the case of the Macclesfield Library, a unique collection that should have been held together, one problem was Lord Macclesfield’s tax position. It was not that Lord Macclesfield owed too much tax, but that he did not owe any at all. The purchase of collections or works of art or scholarship for the nation is based on the remission of tax. Apparently when there is no tax to remit, there are no funds for purchase. Another excuse was given in 2004 by Lord McIntosh of Haringey, the Minister for the Media and Heritage. He wrote a letter which effectively ended the hopes of saving the Macclesfield Library. He wrote that it was not for Resource to approach private owners “as auction houses would take great exception to this”.
It would be hard to think of a less plausible excuse. No auction house is known to have objected to Resource or the department approaching private owners. On the contrary, auction houses often helped to initiate such negotiations. If they did object, their objections would have no standing.
Mr Barker was, however, told a real truth by one civil servant with whom he negotiated. “When it comes to priorities you have to read DCMS backwards: Sport before Media, Media before Culture.” That is proved by the statistics of funding. “Between 2001 and 2006, the DCMS will have increased funding for sport by 91 per cent, the arts by 63 per cent, and museums, libraries and archives by 26 per cent.” A report by the London School of Economics suggests that museums, libraries and archives have nothing less to do but “prepare for an orderly management of decline”.
But the digital age offers infinitely better access to museums, libraries and archives. Far from being a period of decline, it opens up an unprecedented opportunity. This opportunity will not be taken so long as ministers believe that David Beckham and Wayne Rooney matter far more than John Murray and Isaac Newton.